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Abstract
Local differential privacy has become the gold-standard of privacy literature for gathering or releasing
sensitive individual data points in a privacy-preserving manner. However, locally differential data can
twist the probability density of the data because of the additive noise used to ensure privacy. In fact, the
density of privacy-preserving data (no matter how many samples we gather) is always flatter in compari-
son with the density function of the original data points due to convolution with privacy-preserving noise
density function. The effect is especially more pronounced when using slow-decaying privacy-preserving
noises, such as the Laplace noise. This can result in under/over-estimation of the heavy-hitters. This is
an important challenge facing social scientists due to the use of differential privacy in the 2020 Census in
the United States. In this paper, we develop density estimation methods using smoothing kernels. We
use the framework of deconvoluting kernel density estimators to remove the effect of privacy-preserving
noise. This approach also allows us to adapt the results from non-parameteric regression with errors-in-
variables to develop regression models based on locally differentially private data. We demonstrate the
performance of the developed methods on financial and demographic datasets.
Introduction
Government regulations, such as the roll-out of the General Data Protection Regulation in the European
Union (EU)1, the California Consumer Privacy Act2, and the development of the Data Sharing and Release
Bill in Australia3 increasingly prohibit sharing customers data without explicit consent [1].
A strong candidate for ensuring privacy is differential privacy. Differential privacy intuitively uses ran-
domization to provide plausible deniability for the data of an individual by ensuring that the statistics of
privacy-preserving outputs do not change significantly by varying the data of an individual [2,3]. Companies
like Apple4, Google5, Microsoft6, and LinkedIn7 have rushed to develop projects and to integrate differential
privacy into their products. Even, the US Census Bureau has decided to implement differential privacy in
2020 Census [4]. Of course, this has created much controversy pointing to “ripple effect on the many public
and private organizations that conduct surveys based on census data” [5].
A variant of differential privacy is local differential privacy in which all data points are randomized before
being used by the aggregator, who attempts to infer the data distribution or some of its properties [6–8].
This is in contrast with differential privacy in which the data is first processed and then obfuscated by noise.
Local differential privacy ensures that the data is kept private from the aggregator by adding noise to the
individual data entries before the aggregation process. This is a preferred choice when dealing with untrusted
∗The author is with the Department of Electrical and Electronic Engineering at the University of Melbourne. e-mail:
farhad.farokhi@unimelb.edu.au
1https://gdpr-info.eu
2https://oag.ca.gov/privacy/ccpa
3https://www.pmc.gov.au/public-data/data-sharing-and-release-reforms
4https://www.apple.com/privacy/docs/Differential_Privacy_Overview.pdf
5https://developers.googleblog.com/2019/09/enabling-developers-and-organizations.html
6https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/ai/ai-lab-differential-privacy
7https://engineering.linkedin.com/blog/2019/04/privacy-preserving-analytics-and-reporting-at-linkedin
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aggregators, e.g., third party service providers or commercial retailers with financial interests, or when it is
desired to release an entire dataset publicly for research in a privacy-preserving manner [9].
Locally differential data can significantly distort our estimates of the probability density of the data
because of the additive noise used to ensure privacy. The density of privacy-preserving data can become
flatter in comparison with the density function of the original data points due to convolution of its density
with privacy-preserving noise density. The situation can be even more troubling when using slow-decaying
privacy-preserving noises, such as the Laplace noise. This concern is true irrespective of how many samples
are gathered. This can result in under/over-estimation of the heavy-hitters, a common and worrying criticism
of using differential privacy in the US Census [10].
Estimating probability distributions/densities under differential privacy is of extreme importance as it is
often the first step in gaining more important insights into the data, such as regression analysis. However,
most of the existing work on probability distributions estimation based on locally differential private data
focuses on categorical data [11–15]. For categorical data (in contrast with numerical data), the privacy-
preserving noise is no longer additive, e.g., the so-called exponential mechanism [16] or other boutique
differential privacy mechanisms [17] are often employed that are not on the offer in the 2020 US Census.
The work on continuous domains is often done by binning or quantizing the domain. However, finding the
optimal number of bins or quantization resolution depending on privacy parameters, data distribution, and
number of data points is a challenging task.
In this paper, we take a different approach to density estimation by using kernels and thus eliminat-
ing the need to quantize the domain. We particularly use the framework of deconvoluting kernel density
estimators [18–21] to remove the effect of privacy-preserving noise, which is often in the form of Laplace
noise [22]. This approach also allows us to adapt the results from non-parameteric regression with errors-
in-variables [23–25] to develop regression models based on locally differentially private data. These are
important challenges facing social science researchers and demographers in the face of changes administered
in the 2020 Census in the United States [4].
Methods
Consider independently distributed data points {x[i]}ni=1 ⊂ Rq, for some fixed dimension q ≥ 1, from
common probability density function φx. Each data point x[i] ∈ Rq belongs to an individual. Under no
privacy restrictions, the data points can be provided to the central aggregator to construct an estimate of
the density φx denoted by φ̂x. We may use kernel K, which is a bounded even probability density function,
to generate the density estimate φ̂x. A widely recognized example of a kernel is the Gaussian kernel [26] in
K(x) =
1√
(2pi)q
exp
(
−1
2
x>x
)
. (1)
In the big data regime n  1, the choice of the kernel is not crucial to the accuracy of kernel density
estimators so long as it meets the conditions in [18]. In this paper, we keep the kernel general. By using
kernel K, we can construct the estimate
φ̂npx (x) =
1
nhq
n∑
i=1
K((x− x[i])/h), (2)
where h > 0 is the bandwidth. The bandwidth is often selected such that h → 0 as n → ∞. The optimal
rate of decay for the bandwidth has been established for families of distributions [18,21].
As discussed in the introduction, due to privacy restrictions, the exact data points {x[i]}ni=1 might not
be available to generate the density estimate in (2). The aggregator may only have access to noisy versions
of these data points:
z[i] = x[i] + n[i], (3)
where n[i] is a privacy-preserving additive noise. To ensure differential privacy, Laplace additive noises is
often used [22]. For any probability density φ, we use the notation supp(φ) to denote its support set, i.e.,
supp(φ) := {ξ : φ(ξ) > 0}.
2
Assumption 1 (Bounded Support). supp(φx) ⊆
∏q
i=1[xi, xi] for finite constants xi ≤ xi.
Assumption 1 is without loss of generality as we are always dealing with bounded domains in social
sciences with a priori known bounds on the data (e.g., the population of a region).
Definition 1 (Local Differential Privacy). The reporting mechanism in (3) is -(locally) differentially private
for  ≥ 0 if
P{x[i] + n[i] ∈ Z|x[i] = x} ≤ exp()P{x[i] + n[i] ∈Z|x[i] = x′}, ∀x,x′ ∈ supp(φx),
for any Borel-measurable set Z ⊆ Rq.
Definition 1 ensures that the statistics of privacy-preserving output x[i] + n[i], determined by its distri-
bution, do not change “significantly” (the magnitude of change is bounded by the privacy parameter ) if
the data of individual x[i] changes. If → 0, the output becomes more noisy and a higher privacy guarantee
is achieved. Laplace additive noise is generally used to ensure differential privacy. This is formalized in the
following theorem, which is borrowed from [22].
Theorem 1. Let {n[i]}ni=1 be distributed according to the common multivariate Laplace density:
φn(n) =
1
2q
∏q
j=1 bj
exp
− q∑
j=1
|nj |
bj
 ,
where nj is the j-th component of n ∈ Rq. The reporting mechanism in (3) is -locally differentially private
if bj = q(xj − xj)/ for j ∈ {1, . . . , q}.
In what follows, we assume that the reporting policy in Theorem 1 is used to generate locally differentially
private data points. Since {n[i]}ni=1 are distributed according to the common density φn(n), {z[i]}qi=1 would
also follow a common probability density, which is denoted by φz. Note that
Φz(t) = Φx(t)Φn(t), (4)
where Φz, Φx, and Φn are the characteristic functions of φz, φx, and φn. Using (4), we can use any
approximation of Φz to construct an approximation of Φx and thus estimate φx. If we use kernel K for
estimating density of z[i], ∀i, we get
φ̂z(z) =
1
nhq
n∑
i=1
K((z− z[i])/h).
Here, φ̂z is used to denote the approximation of φz. The characteristic function of φ̂z is given by
Φ̂z(t) =ΦK(ht)Φ̂(t),
where ΦK(t) is the characteristic function of K and Φ̂(t) is the empirical characteristic function of measure-
ments {z[i]}ni=1, defined as
Φ̂(t) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
exp
(
it>z[i]
)
.
Therefore, the characteristic function of φ̂x is given by
Φ̂x(t) =
ΦK(Ht)Φ̂(t)
Φn(t)
3
Further, note that
Φn(t) =E
{
exp
(
it>n
)}
=E {exp (it1n1) exp (it2n2) · · · exp (itqnq)}
=E {exp (it1n1)}E {exp (it2n2)} · · ·E {exp (itqnq)}
=
q∏
j=1
1
1 + b2j t
2
j
,
where tj is the j-th component of t ∈ Rq. We get
φ̂x(x) =
1
nhq
n∑
i=1
K̂h((x− z[i])/h), (5)
where
K̂h(x) =
1
(2pi)q
∫
Rq
exp(−it>x) ΦK(t)
Φn(t/h)
dt
=
1
(2pi)q
∫
Rq
exp(−it>x)
q∏
j=1
(
1 +
b2
h2
t2j
)
ΦK(t)dt
=
q∏
j=1
(
1− b
2
j
h2
∂2
∂x2j
)
K(x),
where xj is the j-th component of x ∈ Rq.
Under appropriate conditions on the kernel K [18], we can see that
E{φ̂x(x)|{xi}ni=1} = φ̂npx (x). (6)
Therefore, φ̂x(x) in (5) is effectively an unbiased estimate of φ̂
np
x (x) in (2). In average, we are canceling
the effect of the differential privacy noise. Furthermore, if h scales according to n−1/5, φ̂x(x) is a consistent
estimator of φx as n→∞, i.e., φ̂x(x) converges φx point-wise for all x ∈ supp(φx).
For regression analysis, we consider independently distributed data points {(x[i],y[i])}ni=1 from common
probability density function. We would like to understand the relationship between inputs x[i] and outputs
y[i] for all i. Similarly, we assume that we can only access noisy privacy-preserving inputs {z[i]}ni=1 instead
of accurate inputs {x[i]}ni=1. Following the argument above, we can also construct the Nadaraya-Watson
kernel regression (see, e.g., [27]) as
m̂(x) :=
∑n
i=1 K̂h((x− z[i])/h)y[i]∑n
i=1 K̂h((x− z[i])/h)
. (7)
Under appropriate conditions on the kernel K and the bandwidth h [25], m̂(x) converges to E{y|x} almost
surely. In practice the bandwidth can be computed by minimizing the cross-validation cost, i.e., the error of
estimating each y[`] using the Nadaraya-Watson kernel regression constructed from {(z[i],y[i])}i∈{1,...,n}\{`}
averaged over all choices of `.
Results
In this section, we demonstrate the performance of the developed methods on financial and demographic
datasets.
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Figure 1: Estimates of probability density function of the credit score using original noiseless data with original kernel φ̂npx (x) =
1
nh
∑n
i=1K((x− x[i])/h) (solid gray), -locally differential private data with original kernel φ˜x(x) = 1nh
∑n
i=1K((x− z[i])/h)
(dashed black), and -locally differential private data with adjusted kernel φ̂x(x) =
1
nh
∑n
i=1Kh((x− z[i])/h) (solid black) for
 = 5.0 and bandwidth h = 0.1.
Lending Club Dataset
The dataset contains information of 2,260,701 accepted and 27,648,741 rejected loans application on Lending
Club, a peer-to-peer lending platform, over 2007 to 2018. The dataset is available for download on Kaggle [28].
For the accepted loans, dataset contains interest rates of the loans per annum and loan attributes, such as
total loan size, and borrower information, such as number of credit lines, credit rating, state of residence,
and age. Here, we only focus on data from 2010 (to avoid possible yearly fluctuations of the interest rate),
which contains 12,537 accepted loans. We also focus on the relationship between the FICO8 credit score
(low range) and the interest rates of the loan. This is an interesting relationship pointing to the value of
credit rating reports [29]. The FICO credit score is very sensitive (as it relates to the financial health of an
individual) and possesses a significant commercial value (as it is sold by a for-profit corporation). Thus, we
assume that is is made available publicly in a privacy-preserving manner using (3). Note that the original
data in [28] provides this data in an anonymized manner without privacy-preserving noise.
We use the following original kernel:
K(x) =
1
pi
1
1 + x2
.
Note that x = x is a scalar as we are only considering credit score as an input. This is the Cauchy distribution.
We get the adjusted kernel in
K̂h(x) =
(
1− b
2
h2
d2
dx
)
K(x)
=
1
pi
[
1
1 + x2
− b
2
h2
8x2
(x2 + 1)3
+
b2
h2
2
(x2 + 1)2
]
.
We use cross-validation to find the bandwidth in the following experiments.
Figure 1 illustrates estimates of probability density function of the credit score φx(x) using original
noiseless data with original kernel φ̂npx (x) in (2) (solid gray), -locally differential private data with original
kernel φ˜x(x) =
1
nh
∑n
i=1K((x− z[i])/h) (dashed black), and -locally differential private data with adjusted
kernel in (5) (solid black) for  = 5.0 and bandwidth h = 0.1. Note that φ˜x(x) =
1
nh
∑n
i=1K((x − z[i])/h)
is a naive density estimate as it does not try to cancel the effect of the privacy-preserving noise. Clearly,
using the original kernel for the noisy privacy-preserving data flattens the density estimate φ˜x(x). This is
because we are in fact observing a convolution of the original probability density with the probability density
8https://www.fico.com/en/products/fico-score
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Figure 2: The kernel regression model (solid black) and the linear regression model (dashed black) based on the original data
with bandwidth h = 0.02 superimposed on the original noiseless data (gray dots). The mean squared error for the kernel
regression model is 4.42 and the mean squared error for the linear regression model is 4.61.
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Figure 3: The kernel regression model (solid black) and the linear regression model (dashed black) based on the -locally
differential private data with  = 5 and bandwidth h = 0.20 superimposed on the original noiseless data (gray dots). The mean
squared error for the kernel regression model is 5.70 and the mean squared error for the linear regression model is 7.11.
of the Laplace noise. Upon using the adjusted kernel K̂h(x) the estimate of the probability density using the
noisy privacy-preserving data matches the estimate of the probability density with the original data (with
additional fluctuations due to the presence of noise). This provides a numerical validation of (6).
Now, let us focus on the regression analysis. Figure 2 shows the kernel regression model (solid black) and
the linear regression model (dashed black) based on the original data with bandwidth h = 0.02 superimposed
on the original noiseless data (gray dots). The mean squared error for the kernel regression model is 4.42 and
the mean squared error for the linear regression model is 4.61. The kernel regression model is thus slightly
superior (roughly 4%) to the linear regression model; however, the gap is narrow. Figure 3 illustrates the
kernel regression model (solid black) and the linear regression model (dashed black) based on the -locally
differential private data with  = 5 and bandwidth h = 0.20 superimposed on the original noiseless data
(gray dots). The mean squared error for the kernel regression model is 5.70 and the mean squared error
for the linear regression model is 7.11. In this case, the kernel regression model is considerably (roughly
20%) better. In Figure 4, we observe the mean squared error for the kernel regression model and the linear
regression model based on the -locally differential private data versus privacy budget . Clearly, the kernel
regression model is consistently superior to the linear regression model. As  grows larger, the performance
of the kernel regression model and the linear regression model based on the -locally differential private
data converge to the performance of the kernel regression model and the linear regression model based on
original noiseless data. This intuitively makes sense as, by increasing the privacy budget, the magnitude of
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Figure 4: The mean squared error for the kernel regression model and the linear regression model based on the -locally
differential private (-LDP in the legend) data versus privacy budget . The horizontal lines show the mean squared error for
the kernel regression model and the linear regression model based on original noiseless data.
the privacy-preserving noise becomes smaller.
Adult Dataset
The dataset contains information of 32,561 individuals from the 1994 Census database. The dataset is
available for download on UCI [30]. The dataset contains attributes, such as education, age, work type,
gender, race, and a binary report whether the individual earns more than 50,000$ per year. We also focus
on the relationship between the education (in years) and the individual ability to earn more than 50,000$
per year. The education is assumed to be made public in a privacy-preserving form following (3). This
information can be considered private as it can be used in conjunction with other information to de-anonymize
the dataset.
Figure 5 The kernel regression model (solid black) and the logistic regression model (dashed black) based
on the original data with bandwidth h = 0.17. The logarithm of the likelihood for the kernel regression
model is −0.49 and the logarithm of the likelihood for the logistic regression model is −0.50. The kernel
regression model is thus slightly superior (roughly 2%) to the logistic regression model; however, the gap is
almost negligible. Figure 6 illustrates the kernel regression model (solid black) and the logistic regression
model (dashed black) based on the -locally differential private data with  = 5.0 bandwidth h = 2.98. The
logarithm of the likelihood for the kernel regression model is −0.51 and the logarithm of the likelihood for the
logistic regression model is −0.53. In this case, the kernel regression model is slightly (roughly 4%) better. In
Figure 7, we observe the logarithm of the likelihood for the kernel regression model and the logistic regression
model based on the -locally differential private data versus privacy budget . The horizontal lines show
the logarithm of the likelihood for the kernel regression model and the logistic regression model based on
original noiseless data. Again, the kernel regression model is consistently superior to the logistic regression
model. However, the effect is not as pronounced as the linear regression in the previous subsection. Finally,
again, as  grows larger, the performance of the kernel regression model and the logistic regression model
based on the -locally differential private data converge to the performance of the kernel regression model
and the linear regression model based on original noiseless data.
Discussion
The density of privacy-preserving data is always flatter in comparison with the density function of the
original data points due to convolution with privacy-preserving noise density function. This is certainly
a cause for concern due to addition of differential-privacy noise in 2020 US Census. This unfortunate
effect is always present irrespective of how many samples we gather because we observe the convolution
of the original probability density with the probability density of the privacy-preserving noise. This can
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Figure 5: The kernel regression model (solid black) and the logistic regression model (dashed black) based on the original data
with bandwidth h = 0.17. The logarithm of the likelihood for the kernel regression model is −0.49 and the logarithm of the
likelihood for the logistic regression model is −0.50.
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Figure 6: The kernel regression model (solid black) and the logistic regression model (dashed black) based on the -locally
differential private data with  = 5.0 bandwidth h = 2.98. The logarithm of the likelihood for the kernel regression model is
−0.51 and the logarithm of the likelihood for the logistic regression model is −0.53.
result in miss-estimation of the heavy-hitters that often play an important role in social sciences due to
their ties to minority groups. We developed density estimation methods using smoothing kernels and used
the framework of deconvoluting kernel density estimators to remove the effect of privacy-preserving noise.
This can result in a superior performance both for estimating probability density functions and for kernel
regression in comparison to popular regression techniques, such as linear and logistic regression models. In
the case of estimating the probability density function, we could entirely remove the flatting effect of the
privacy-preserving noise at the cost of additional fluctuations. The fluctuations however could be reduced
by gathering more data.
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